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In the past few years, Maine's electric utilities have begun to face the forces of competition. 
Maine is experiencing the effects of a national trend, a shift from a traditional and regulated 
system to a more innovative and competitive one. The following four articles offer differing 
perspectives on this complex and controversial issue. In the first of this series, Gordon Weil, 
active in Maine and elsewhere in promoting increased competition in the electric industry, 
explains the forces for competition. Mr. Weil traces the history of the electric power market from 
its beginnings as a monopoly, to its present status where all of the forces promoting competition 
nationally are at play in Maine.  
The latter three articles are taken from the authors' presentations at a December 1994 
conference entitled Retail Wheeling, sponsored by the Margaret Chase Smith Center for Public 
Policy's Project for the Study of Regulation and the Environment. William C. Perkins analyzes a 
number of potential costs and risks of full-scale retail wheeling. Armond Cohen explores the 
environmental impacts that are at stake in restructuring and offers some possible solutions. 
Finally, James F. Mitchell describes some of the political and financial limits to restructuring 
and provides suggestions for how to proceed in creating full and fair competition.  
Electric service: The next generation  
Gordon L. Weil  
The operating environment for the electric power industry has changed fundamentally. 
Monopolies, thought to be inevitable and immutable, are crumbling. Competition, unthinkable 
even a few years ago, is now the watchword. What has happened?  
In the beginning: Monopoly  
Electric utilities began as small municipal or industrial power generators serving a limited 
number of customers—those who could be reached economically by the power lines. At the 
outset, they looked much like water utilities do today. Each was a separate company or 
municipal entity, frequently not even serving all of a single town. Edison's original light 
company served only a portion of Manhattan. As the advantages of electric power became more 
evident, these small electric companies proliferated, pushing aside the gas light and hydro-
mechanical power as the driving force of the local economy. These electric utilities provided a 
bundled service: The generation and distribution of power to its customers.  
By the second decade of the twentieth century, regulation of electric utilities had become 
common. On the surface, regulation by state bodies was designed to protect the customers of 
monopoly utilities from exploitation, but it also established franchise territories from which one 
electric company might exclude competitors. The utilities claimed that without such protection 
they could not achieve the stability and economies of scale required to provide economical 
service.  
As a result of the early introduction of regulation, competition was never given an opportunity. 
Customers gained by the utility's obligation to serve all customers in its franchise area, but they 
soon were required to rely on regulators alone as the surrogate for competition. Thus, an 
administered system was called upon to simulate, as well as possible, the effects of a competitive 
market. 
Some electric utilities wanted more than the ability to dominate a local market area; their 
aspirations were national. With the enactment of the Public Utility Holding Company Act 
(PUHCA) in 1935, Congress ended the threat of domination of the electric market by a few 
national utilities. With the Rural Electrification Act, it helped establish new utilities in areas 
where the power companies chose not to provide service.  
The energy crisis and its aftermath  
There matters stood until the energy crisis of the 1970s. The electric utility business was seen as 
a natural monopoly with captive customers whom utilities had an obligation to serve. As part of 
the response to American dependence on foreign oil, Congress enacted the Public Utility 
Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA) of 1978. In its effort to promote indigenous renewable 
resources, PURPA authorized the creation of a new entrant into the utility world, one that would 
break the monopoly relationship. By encouraging the creation of so-called "qualifying facilities" 
(QFs), which used generating plants not controlled by utilities but from which utilities were 
required to purchase power, PURPA inadvertently set in motion the trend to competition.  
Bundled electric service was no longer inevitable. The local electric utility might well no longer 
own all of its own generation; instead some might be obtained from QFs. In effect, these 
generators could market their power if they could compete successfully against the utility's own 
resources.  
Other utilities move toward competition  
While these modest beginnings occurred in the electric industry, other utilities were undergoing 
more accelerated and more substantial change. The national monopoly held by AT&T was ended 
because it could no longer be justified technologically. The method used was unbundling of 
different telecommunications services, such as long distance service and customer equipment. 
While many lamented the end of a simpler era, customers had to recognize that unbundling 
meant competition and that competition offered the potential of lower costs.  
In the natural gas industry, federal regulators determined that pipeline companies, which owned 
and controlled natural gas during transmission between the producer and the local distribution 
company (LDC), might better be limited to a transportation function, without actually owning 
the commodity. Customers were encouraged to shop directly for gas supplies and then to 
contract for transportation. As a result of unbundling services, pipelines and even LDCs would 
become simply carriers of other people's natural gas.  
Some in the electric industry continued to feel that, because of its high capital costs and the 
inability to store its products, the electric industry was different and immune from the forces of 
competition. But close scrutiny revealed that competition was eating into the traditional 
monopoly even as major changes were occurring in other sectors. "Wholesale utilities," such as 
municipal distribution utilities that generate little or none of their own power, were increasingly 
interested in purchasing from other than their traditional suppliers. And escalating electric rates 
were driving customers to alternative fuels.  
Northeast Utilities/Public Service merger  
Public Service Company of New Hampshire (PSNH) had been forced to file for reorganization 
under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code as the result of its ill-fated investment in the Seabrook nuclear 
station. Ultimately, Northeast Utilities (NU), one of the two largest electric companies in New 
England, offered to acquire PSNH to resolve the problem. This merger required the approval of 
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). Most importantly, FERC was required to 
find that the proposed merger was not anti-competitive. With its acquisition of PSNH, NU would 
have what one witness called a "transmission curtain" across the face of New England. Utilities 
in eastern Massachusetts could not purchase power from Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, New 
York, or Canada without passing through the expanded NU system. NU had significant 
generation surpluses (thanks in part to Seabrook) and might make access to transmission across 
its system both difficult and expensive to encourage purchases from NU itself. Utilities on the 
wrong side of the curtain complained that the merger, unless subject to strict conditions, would 
produce an anti-competitive result. NU countered that such utilities could always purchase power 
from QFs close to home and could thus avoid the NU system.  
FERC was persuaded by these worries. While it authorized the merger, FERC required NU to 
file transmission tariffs that were strictly cost-based and that would not hinder the access of 
others to the market. FERC went so far as to prescribe rules for allocating costs of new 
transmission facilities between "native load" customers and third parties. Using the unusual 
circumstance of having a powerful grip on a large utility, FERC forced recognition that a utility 
should not be allowed to use control of transmission to control markets. Yet that was precisely 
what most utilities had been doing.  
The Energy Policy Act (EPAct) of 1992  
On Capital Hill, Congress watched the NU-PSNH case with interest while it considered 
amendments to PUHCA. Electric utilities, unhappy with a growing share of generation in the 
hands of non-utility generators that they could not control, sought the right to develop generation 
outside of their own market area and to become generating companies.  
As a quid pro quo for such PUHCA reforms, Congress considered the issue of transmission 
access. Utilities had always been permitted to offer transmission service to others, but had 
relatively seldom done so. FERC was authorized, under certain circumstances, to require 
wheeling, but it had never done so. The EPAct reformed two sections of the Federal Power Act. 
It required owners of transmission facilities to provide wheeling to utilities and non-utilities. The 
EPAct specifically stated that open access wheeling would not apply to retail wheeling, i.e. 
transmission to end-use customers. In this important respect, the federal treatment of electricity 
differs from the regime applying to natural gas or telecommunications. The established utilities, 
while forced to accept open access as the price of PUHCA reform, successfully fended off retail 
wheeling.  
Although not included in the EPAct itself, the concept of regional transmission groups (RTGs) 
gained wide acceptance during the legislative process and was later adopted by FERC. Large 
groups of utilities and non-utilities are encouraged to form RTGs to set ground rules for open 
access within a specific area, within FERC-imposed standards, including the construction of new 
facilities and transmission pricing. RTGs could amount to subordinate regulatory entities to the 
FERC, making transmission access easier through the establishment of detailed rules and dispute 
resolution procedures. RTGs could help accelerate the development of the open power market.  
New England attempted to develop a regional transmission arrangement (RTA), first as part of 
the settlement of the NU-PSNH merger case and later as an ambitious effort to create a regional 
pricing mechanism. While this effort failed, a renewed attempt has been made by New England 
utilities, regulators, and non-utility generators to develop an RTG.  
Maine utilities lag behind others in the region in not having filed transmission tariffs with FERC. 
Access is clearly impeded when potential customers do not know the cost of transmission. A 
New England RTG is likely to cause Central Maine Power (CMP) and Bangor Hydro-Electric 
(BHE) to develop their own tariffs; Maine Public Service, not a likely RTG participant, will only 
do so if subjected to market pressures.  
A new day for wholesale utilities  
There are about 2,000 municipal electric utilities and 1,000 electric cooperatives in the United 
States. Many have been captive customers of their suppliers. In theory they had access to the 
open market, but this access depended entirely on the willingness of the utility that surrounded 
their service territory to provide transmission service. FERC authority to order this transmission 
was so circumscribed as to be nonexistent.  
The transmission barrier to wholesale market access began to crumble even before the passage of 
the EPAct. Entergy, a holding company of several southern utilities, agreed to provide access on 
its system to its wholesale customers, provided they would pay for the cost of any Entergy 
facilities that were "stranded" by their exit. On a smaller scale, other utilities had offered open 
access but with many conditions. During the NU-PSNH merger case, as FERC began to 
recognize the anti-competitive effect of transmission domination, a group of New England 
transmission dependent utilities (TDUs) attracted attention for their demands for unfettered 
access. During the New England RTA negotiations, many of them were able to negotiate new 
arrangements with their surrounding utilities to ensure access to the market and fair calculation 
of their share of transmission costs.  
In another case, Unitil, a New Hampshire utility, wanted to end its purchases from PSNH to 
avoid Seabrook costs. PSNH claimed that, as a matter of public policy, Unitil should not be 
allowed to avoid its share of the Seabrook costs. But FERC ruled that a supply contract between 
Unitil and PSNH provided for termination of service without payment.  
A case from Maine was yet another step on the road to competition. Houlton Water Company, 
Maine Public Service Company's largest customer, and the other wholesale customers of Maine 
Public argued that they had the right, pursuant to a 1985 contract, to terminate service from 
Maine Public. In opposition, Maine Public maintained that Houlton had an obligation to pay 
Seabrook-related costs, whether or not it remained a customer. In short, Maine Public asserted 
that Houlton was obligated to pay stranded investment if it were to leave. Houlton argued that a 
contract provision must prevail over Maine Public's claims and that its contract both dealt 
directly with Seabrook costs and contained explicit provisions to terminate service by paying an 
"exit fee." FERC ruled in favor of Houlton.  
The Houlton case lent further support to the benefits of open competition. While the Houlton 
complaint was pending at FERC, Maine Public filed for and received an 11 percent rate increase. 
When Houlton, using its right to terminate its contract with Maine Public, went to the market, the 
lowest bidder was Maine Public itself, based on a 19 percent rate cut. The Houlton case clearly 
indicates the merits of competition over regulation in setting power prices.  
But it was a case involving Madison Electric Works (MEW) that gained Maine national attention 
and came to symbolize the opening of the competitive market. MEW and its large industrial 
customer, Madison Paper Industries, represented about three percent of total CMP load. When 
MEW issued a bid solicitation, CMP failed to submit a bid before the deadline. MEW selected 
Connecticut-based Northeast Utilities as its supplier, with a savings of 42 percent on its power 
supply costs. The shift of a large part of its load to an out-of-state utility aroused CMP's 
opposition, but the matter was ultimately resolved to allow the new contract, effective September 
1, 1994.  
To be sure, the EPAct would allow any utility to do what MEW had done, but the boldness of the 
move and CMP's belated response attracted wide attention to the opportunities provided by the 
new law. MEW's success became an advertisement for municipal power, beginning a movement 
under which Maine municipalities seriously undertook to investigate the creation of new, local 
utilities.  
New players in the market  
The EPAct, which opened transmission access to non-utilities, stimulated the creation of electric 
marketers and brokers, intent on taking advantage of the new market opportunity. Brokers have 
proliferated, seeking to put together deals between existing market participants. Few have been 
successful, because utilities have a long tradition of selling power among themselves without 
intermediaries. But the presence of brokers has at least helped to stimulate the market.  
Marketers, who purchase power and re-sell it, appear poised to play a more significant role. 
Entities such as Enron Power Marketing and Louis Dreyfus Electric Power, both parts of 
enterprises with annual revenues exceeding $10 billion, purchase power and repackage it for the 
market. They can add value through risk management and power dispatch services, which may 
make them more attractive to utilities than brokers.  
The power of the bid solicitation  
The most significant force stimulating greater competition is the request for proposals to supply 
power. As the MEW case proved, no potential supplier can afford to ignore any opportunity to 
sell power and no potential customer can afford to ignore a chance to pay less for its power 
supply. The bid solicitation is the trigger mechanism for both.  
In one case, a Virginia municipality sought power supply bids even before it had created a power 
district, using the process to help decide if it should create a district. In another celebrated case, 
the city of Las Cruces, NM did much the same; the city council created a power district, obtained 
a power supply and then went to the public, which overwhelming supported the creation of a 
power district. In Maine, nine consumer-owned utilities have used the bid process.  
Competition is particularly fierce now, at a time of substantial surpluses. If ever there were a 
time to resort to the open market, it is now. Because low cost power is available, purchasers can 
afford the expense of inevitable litigation with former suppliers and still pay less than their 
current costs. In the future, when the market tightens, those who have established their position 
in the market will be assured of an opportunity to buy at the lowest available price.  
Retail wheeling: When?  
While the EPAct specifically banned use of the Federal Power Act to require retail wheeling, 
efforts have increased steadily to create a market more akin to natural gas, where the individual 
customer can select its own power supply. Britain is well along the path toward a completely 
open market for all customers. In California, the Public Utilities Commission has gained wide 
public attention for its consideration of a system under which market access is gradually 
extended to smaller customers.  
Retail wheeling may be less imminent than many had thought after the passage of the EPAct. 
First, wholesale wheeling offers many of the advantages without creating a situation in which the 
large industrial customers leave behind residential and small commercial customers. The creation 
of new municipal utilities is now legally possible in far more states than is retail wheeling. 
Second, stranded investment issues must be resolved before retail wheeling will be possible. 
Third, many customers cannot manage their power supply and need the services of a utility or 
dispatch facility.  
Furthermore, as Bangor Hydro-Electric (BHE) has shown, an existing utility may provide almost 
the same benefits as retail wheeling. BHE has developed a designated supply arrangement, under 
which it will purchase power from a specific resource, mark its price up and sell the power to a 
specific customer. The customer obtains the benefits of the open market price plus the reliability 
of the utility, and the utility assures itself of a contribution to its fixed costs through the mark-up. 
Other customers benefit from this contribution and avoid the risk of receiving no contribution if 
the larger customer chooses to self-generate and leave the system. BHE has developed such a 
mechanism to retain James River Paper as a customer.  
Stranded investment: The dark side of the competitive force  
Electric utilities have always faced the risk that customers will leave the market area or will self- 
generate. However, utilities now perceive the competitive market as an added risk and one 
caused by government action. A debate now rages as to whether the utilities should have been 
aware that the loss of customers through competition was inevitable.  
Regulators are beginning to grapple with the fact that the remaining customers or the 
shareholders of a utility may be saddled with costs left behind by departing customers. If a utility 
has invested in generating facilities to meet its obligation to serve all customers and then loses 
some of those customers, should the remaining customers or the shareholders be required to pick 
up those costs? Such costs are called stranded investment, and regulators are trying to find them 
a home.  
A threshold question is if these costs even exist. In the only court decision to date, the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ruled: "There are no stranded investments" 
because a utility can always price its generation to be sold. Yet nobody will buy a Maine utility's 
Seabrook costs for which it receives no power. Perhaps the court would say that such costs, 
known as regulatory assets, should be recovered from shareholders.  
Once this threshold question is addressed, a number of subsidiary questions arise. If stranded 
investments exist, what investment is stranded? For example, transmission investment is not 
likely to be stranded because alternate power supplies are likely to be transmitted over the same 
transmission lines. Could stranded generation costs be mitigated by retirement or sale of the 
plant to others?  
If we find that these costs exist and can identify and quantify them, who should pay them? 
Perhaps shareholders should be deemed to have accepted responsibility as part of their 
investment risk. Perhaps all customers should contribute because all benefit from competition. 
Perhaps the departing customers or the alternate supplier should pay.  
These are real and legitimate issues that merit early resolution if the competitive market is to 
develop. But some utilities use stranded investment as an anti-competitive tool. CMP, for 
example, suggests that stranded investment is actually lost revenues and that it is entitled to all of 
the revenues, possibly net of variable costs, that it otherwise would have received. In other 
words, while stranded investment may be concerned with insuring a return of an investment, 
CMP seems also to seek a continuing return on that investment. The result is a definition of 
stranded investment so broad as to preclude a customer from going to the competitive market.  
FERC has begun the regulatory process to develop stranded investment rules. FERC plans to 
deal with the creation of new municipal utilities and with situations when retail customers 
become wholesale customers, as well as wholesale transactions. At the state level, the Maine 
Public Utilities Commission (PUC) will ultimately deal with retail wheeling, but it has 
withdrawn a proposed stranded investment rule in light of the FERC proposal and almost 
universal opposition to its proposal.  
The competitive response: Incentive regulation  
It would be preferable for utilities to avoid pitfalls on the path to competition. To do so, they 
must be willing to compete for their own current customers. Incentive regulation can make that 
possible.  
A utility needs greater pricing flexibility to be competitive and to act more like its unregulated 
competitors than has been possible in the past. But, because the utility will still have captive 
customers, the utility must protect them from the effects of bad marketing judgments. By the 
same token, the utility should not be required to share with those protected, captive customers 
the benefits of its good judgment. A price cap mechanism, which limits rate increases, provides 
the best protection.  
The Alternative Rate Plan (ARP) developed for CMP in its 1993 rate case is an attractive model. 
CMP may make rate concessions to retain or build load with limited PUC review, which puts in 
play as much as 15 percent of its expected revenues. But it may not raise its rates more than an 
amount determined by an inflation index less a sizeable offset for productivity.  
Anticipating approval of the ARP, CMP negotiated a 15 percent reduction in rates to its largest 
customers, those most likely to have alternatives. Other customers will be protected from a rate 
increase that would have otherwise resulted from such a rate concession. Either CMP will sell 
more energy to its large customers or it will bear the loss. Only in a relatively unlikely worst case 
would other customers have to share a small portion of the costs.  
Through the ARP, the benefits of the competitive market are made available to any customer 
who has a viable alternative to CMP with little or no risk to other customers. It and other forms 
of incentive regulation help bring the competition to all customers while giving utilities time to 
wind down stranded investment.  
Conclusion: Maine in the vanguard  
Virtually all of the forces promoting competition in the electric power market are at play in 
Maine. These include:   
• A lively consumer-owned power sector using the bid process effectively;  
• Open access transmission with pricing yet to be resolved;  
• Designated supply contracts similar to retail wheeling; and  
• An incentive rate mechanism. 
Much remains to be done, notably to insure that utilities are not allowed to block competition 
and that stranded investment issues are resolved through constructive negotiation and not 
destructive conflict.  
Even now, however, the steps that have been taken quite possibly have made Maine the most 
competitive power market in the U.S. In a corner of the country where rates have been among 
the highest, that can only be good news. 
Gordon L. Weil heads an Augusta-based consulting firm promoting increased competition. Mr. 
Weil negotiated the Madison Electric deal, proposed the first Alternative Rate Plan for CMP, 
negotiated in the New England RTA talks, and served as an expert in the NU-PSNH case.  
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